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Galam’s bottom-up hierarchical system and
public debate model revisited
N. Lanchier∗ and N. Taylor
Abstract This article is concerned with the bottom-up hierarchical system and public debate
model proposed by Galam, as well as a spatial version of the public debate model. In all three
models, there is a population of individuals who are characterized by one of two competing
opinions, say opinion −1 and opinion +1. This population is further divided into groups
of common size s. In the bottom-up hierarchical system, each group elects a representative
candidate, whereas in the other two models, all the members of each group discuss at random
times until they reach a consensus. At each election/discussion, the winning opinion is chosen
according to Galam’s majority rule: the opinion with the majority of representants wins when
there is a strict majority while one opinion, say opinion −1, is chosen by default in case of a
tie. For the public debate models, we also consider the following natural updating rule that
we shall call proportional rule: the winning opinion is chosen at random with a probability
equal to the fraction of its supporters in the group. The three models differ in term of their
population structure: in the bottom-up hierarchical system, individuals are located on a finite
regular tree, in the non-spatial public debate model, they are located on a complete graph, and
in the spatial public debate model, they are located on the d-dimensional regular lattice. For
the bottom-up hierarchical system and non-spatial public debate model, Galam studied the
probability that a given opinion wins under the majority rule and assuming that individuals’
opinions are initially independent, making the initial number of supporters of a given opinion
a binomial random variable. The first objective of this paper is to revisit his result assuming
that the initial number of individuals in favor of a given opinion is a fixed deterministic
number. Our analysis reveals phase transitions that are sharper under our assumption than
under Galam’s assumption, particularly with small population size. The second objective is
to determine whether both opinions can coexist at equilibrium for the spatial public debate
model under the proportional rule, which depends on the spatial dimension.
1. Introduction
Galam’s bottom-up hierarchical system and public debate model [2] are used to understand voting
behaviors of two competing opinions in democratic societies. In his models, Galam assumes that
initially individuals in the population are independently in favor of one opinion with a fixed proba-
bility, making the initial number of that type of opinion a binomial random variable. This analysis
revisits Galam’s models by assuming that the initial number of individuals in favor of an opinion is
a fixed deterministic number, which is more realistic when analyzing small populations. This paper
is also concerned with a spatial version of Galam’s public debate model introduced in [5]. Before
stating our results, we start with a detailed description of these three models.
Bottom-up hierarchical system – The bottom-up hierarchical system [2] is a stochastic process
that depends on two parameters: the group size s and the number of voting steps N , which are
both positive integers. The structure of this model, which is displayed in Figure 1, begins with a
population of sN individuals in favor of either opinion +1 or opinion −1 on the bottom level. This
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the bottom-up hierarchical system with s = 3 and N = 3. Black dots represent
individuals supporting opinion +1 and white dots individuals supporting opinion −1.
population is further divided into groups of size s and local majority rules determine a representative
candidate of each group who then ascends to another group at the next lowest level. This process
continues until a single winner at level 0 is elected. When the group size s is odd, majority rule is
well defined, whereas when the group size s is even, a bias is introduced favoring a predetermined
type, say opinion −1, if there is a tie. That is, the representative candidates are determined at
each step according to the majority rule whenever there is a strict majority but is chosen to be the
one in favor of opinion −1 in case of a tie. This assumption is justified by Galam [2] based on the
principle of social inertia. More formally, one can think of the model as a rooted regular tree with
degree s and N levels plus the root. Denote by
Xn(i) for n = 0, 1, . . . , N and i = 1, 2, . . . , s
n
the opinion of the ith node/individual at level n. Then, the opinion of each node is determined
from the configuration of opinions XN at the bottom level and the recursive rule:
Xn(i) := sign (
∑s
j=1Xn+1(s(i− 1) + j)− 1/2) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , sn.
Note in particular that this recursive rule is deterministic making the process stochastic only
through its configuration at the bottom level. Galam [2] assumes that nodes at the bottom level
are independently in favor of a given opinion with a fixed probability. In contrast, we will assume
that the configuration at the bottom level is a random permutation with a fixed number of nodes
in favor of a given opinion.
Non-spatial public debate model – The second model under consideration in this paper is
Galam’s public debate model that examines the dynamics of opinion shifts. This process again
depends on the same two parameters but now evolves in time. There is a population of N individuals
each with either opinion +1 or opinion −1. At each time step, a random group of size s, called
discussion group, is chosen from the population, which results in all the individuals in the group
adopting the same opinion. The updating rule considered in [2] is again the majority rule: if there
are opposing opinions in the discussion group, then the opinion with the majority of supporters
dominates the other opinion causing the individuals who initially supported the minority opinion to
change their opinion to the majority opinion. As previously, when the group size s is even, ties may
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Figure 2. One time step in the non-spatial public debate model with s = 4 and N = 25. Black dots represent
individuals supporting opinion +1 and white dots individuals supporting opinion −1.
occur, in which case a bias is introduced in favor of opinion −1. We refer to Figure 2 for a schematic
representation of this process. In this paper, we will also consider another natural updating rule
that we shall call proportional rule, which assumed that all the individuals in the group adopt
opinion ±1 with a probability equal to the fraction of supporters of this opinion in the group before
discussion. To define these processes more formally, we now let
Xn(i) for n ∈ N and i = 1, 2, . . . , N
be the opinion of individual i at time n. In both processes, a set of s individuals, say Bs, is chosen
uniformly from the population at each time step. Under the majority rule, we set
Xn(i) := sign (
∑
j∈Bs
Xn−1(j)− 1/2) for all i ∈ Bs
while under the proportional rule, we set
Xn(i) := +1 for all i ∈ Bs with probability s−1
∑
j∈Bs
1{Xn(j) = +1}
:= −1 for all i ∈ Bs with probability s−1
∑
j∈Bs
1{Xn(j) = −1}.
In both processes, individuals outside Bs are not affected by the discussion and the evolution
rule is iterated until everyone in the population has the same opinion. We will see later that the
process that keeps track of the number of individuals with opinion +1 rather than the actual
configuration is itself a discrete-time Markov chain. As for the bottom-up hierarchical system, we
will assume that the configuration at time 0 has a fixed number of individuals in favor of a given
opinion whereas Galam studied the (majority rule) public debate model under the assumption that
initially individuals are independently in favor of a given opinion with a fixed probability.
Spatial public debate model – The third model studied in this paper is a spatial version of
the public debate model introduced in [5]. The spatial structure is represented by the infinite d-
dimensional regular lattice. Each site of the lattice is occupied by one individual who is again
characterized by their opinion: either opinion +1 or opinion −1. The population being located
on a geometrical structure, space can be included by assuming that only individuals in the same
neighborhood can interact. More precisely, we assume that the set of discussion groups is
x+Bs for x ∈ Zd where Bs := {0, 1, . . . , s− 1}d
Since the number of discussion groups is infinite and countable, the statement “choosing a group
uniformly at random” is no longer well defined. Therefore, we define the process in continuous time
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using the framework of interacting particle systems assuming that discussion groups are updated
independently at rate one, i.e., at the arrival times of independent Poisson processes with intensity
one. The analysis in [5] is concerned with the spatial model under the majority rule, whereas we
focus on the proportional rule: all the individuals in the same discussion group adopt the same
opinion with a probability equal to the fraction of supporters of this opinion in the group before
discussion. Formally, the state of the process at time t is now a function
ηt : Z
d −→ {−1,+1}
with ηt(x) denoting the opinion at time t of the individual located at site x, and the dynamics of
the process is described by the Markov generator
Lf(η) =
∑
x
∑
z∈Bs
s−d 1{η(x + z) = +1} [f(τ+x η)− f(η)]
+
∑
x
∑
z∈Bs
s−d 1{η(x + z) = −1} [f(τ−x η)− f(η)]
where τ+x and τ
−
x are the operators defined on the set of configurations by
(τ+x η)(z) :=
{
+1 for z ∈ x+Bx
η(z) for z /∈ x+Bx
(τ−x η)(z) :=
{
−1 for z ∈ x+Bx
η(z) for z /∈ x+Bx.
The first part of the generator indicates that, for each x, all the individuals in x + Bs switch
simultaneously to opinion +1 at rate the fraction of individuals with opinion +1 in the group. The
second part gives similar transition rates for opinion −1. In particular, basic properties of Poisson
processes imply that each group is indeed updated at rate one according to the proportional rule.
Note that the process no longer depends on N since the population size is infinite but we will see
that its behavior strongly depends on the spatial dimension d.
2. Main results
For the bottom-up hierarchical system and the non-spatial public debate model, the main problem
is to determine the probability that a given opinion, say opinion +1, wins, as a function of the
density or number of individuals holding this opinion in the initial configuration. For the spatial
public debate model, since the population is infinite, the time to reach a configuration in which all
the individuals share the same opinion is almost surely infinite when starting from a configuration
with infinitely many individuals of each type. In this case, the main problem is to determine whether
opinions can coexist at equilibrium or not.
Galam’s results – Galam studied the bottom-up hierarchical system and the non-spatial public
debate model under the majority rule. As previously explained, the assumption in [2] about the
initial configuration of each model is that individuals are independently in favor of opinion +1 with
some fixed probability. Under this assumption, the analysis is simplified because the probability of
an individual being in favor of a given opinion at one level for the bottom-up hierarchical system
or at one time step for the public debate model can be computed explicitly in a simple manner
from its counterpart at the previous level or time step. More precisely, focusing on the bottom-up
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hierarchical system for concreteness, if pn is the common probability of any given individual being
in favor of opinion +1 at level n then the sequence (pn) can be computed recursively as follows:
pn = Qs(pn+1) where Qs(X) :=
s∑
j=s′
(
s
j
)
Xj (1−X)s−j
with s′ := ⌈(1/2)(s + 1)⌉. The probability that a given opinion wins the election can then be
computed explicitly. For both models, in the limit as the population size tends to infinity, the
problem reduces to finding the fixed points of the polynomial Qs. When s = 3,
Q3(X) −X = 3X2(1−X) +X3 −X
= 3X2(1−X) +X (X − 1)(X + 1) = −X (X − 1)(2X − 1)
therefore 1/2 is a fixed point. It follows that, with probability close to one when the population
size is large, the winning opinion is the one that has initially the largest frequency of representants,
a result that easily extends to all odd sizes. The case of even sizes is more intriguing. When the
group size s = 4, we have
Q4(X) −X = 4X3(1−X) +X4 −X
= −X (X − 1)(3X2 −X − 1) = −3X (X − 1)(X − c−)(X − c+)
(1)
where the roots c− and c+ are given by
c− :=
1−√13
6
≈ −0.434 and c+ := 1 +
√
13
6
≈ 0.768.
This implies that, when the population is large, the probability that opinion +1 wins is near zero
if the initial frequency of its representants is below c+ ≈ 0.768. It can be proved that the same
result holds for the non-spatial public debate model when the population size is large. Because
opinions are initially independent and of a given type with a fixed probability, the initial number
of individuals with opinion +1 is a binomial random variable, and the main reason behind the
simplicity of Galam’s results is that the dynamics of his models preserves this property: at any
level/time, the number of individuals with opinion +1 is again binomial. The first objective of this
paper is to revisit Galam’s results under the assumption that the initial number of individuals with
opinion +1 is a fixed deterministic number rather than binomially distributed. This assumption is
more realistic for small populations but the analysis is also more challenging because the number
of individuals with a given opinion in non-overlapping groups are no longer independent.
Bottom-up hierarchical system – For the bottom-up hierarchical system, we start with a fixed
deterministic number x of individuals holding opinion +1 at the bottom level. The main objective
is then to determine the winning probability
px(N, s) := probability that opinion +1 wins
:= P (X0(1) = +1 | card {i : XN (i) = +1} = x)
(2)
where s is the group size and N is the number of voting steps. Assuming that individuals holding
the same opinion are identical, there are sN choose x possible configurations at the bottom level of
the system. To compute the probability (2), the most natural approach is to compute the number
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of such configurations that result in the election of candidate +1. This problem, however, is quite
challenging so we use instead a different strategy. The main idea is to count configurations which
are compatible with the victory of +1 going backwards in the hierarchy: we count the number
of configurations at level one that result in the election of candidate +1, then the number of
configurations at level two that result in any of these configurations at level one, and so on. To
compute the number of such configurations, for each size-level pair (s, n), we set
s′ := ⌈(1/2)(s + 1)⌉ and Is,n := {0, 1, . . . , (s′ − 1)(sn − x) + (s− s′)x}. (3)
Then, for all y ∈ Is,n, define
cn(s, x, s
′x+ y) =
∑
z0,...,zs
(
sn
x
)−1( sn
z0, z1, . . . , zs
) s∏
j=0
(
s
j
)zj
(4)
where the sum is over all z0, z1, . . . , zs such that
z0 + z1 + · · · + zs′−1 = sn − x and zs′ + zs′+1 + · · ·+ zs = x
and such that ∑s′−1
j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) = y if s is odd∑s′−2
j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) + (s
′ − 1) zs′−1 = y if s is even.
We will prove that the number of configurations with s′x + y individuals holding opinion +1 at
level n + 1 that result in a given configuration with x individuals holding opinion +1 at level n is
exactly given by (4). The fact that the evolution rules are deterministic also implies that different
configurations at a given level cannot result from the same configuration at a lower level. In par-
ticular, the number of configurations at the bottom level that result in the victory of opinion +1
can be deduced from a simple summation as in the proof of Chapman-Kolmogorov’s equations in
the theory of Markov chains. More precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Bottom-up hierarchical system) – For all s ≥ 3, we have
px(N, s) =
(
sN
x
)−1 s∑
x1=0
s2∑
x2=0
· · ·
sN−1∑
xN−1=0
N∏
n=1
cn(s, xn−1, xn) (5)
where x0 = 1 and xN = x.
The expression for the probability (5) cannot be simplified but for any fixed parameter it can be
computed explicitly. In the case of groups of size s = 3, (4) reduces to
cn(3, x, 2x + y) =
∑
i+j=y
(
x
i
)(
3n − x
j
)
3x−i+j for y ∈ {0, . . . , 3n} (6)
while in the case of groups of size s = 4, this reduces to
cn(4, x, 3x + y) =
∑
i+2j+k=y
(
x
i
)(
4n − x
j
)(
4n − x− j
k
)
4x−i+k 6j (7)
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Figure 3. Probability that opinion +1 wins as a function of the initial density/number of its supporters at the bottom
level of the bottom-up hierarchical system for different values of the number of levels and group size. The continuous
black curve is the graph of the function p 7→ QNs (p) corresponding to the winning probability when assuming that
individuals at the bottom level hold independently opinion +1 with probability p. The black dots are the probabilities
computed from Theorem 1 when starting from a fixed number of individuals holding opinion +1.
for all y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 × 4n − x}. Figure 3 shows the probabilities computed from (5)–(7) for
different values of the number of levels and group size along with the corresponding probabilities
under Galam’s assumption. The figure reveals that the phase transition is sharper when starting
from a fixed number rather than a binomially distributed number of individuals holding a given
opinion. This aspect is more pronounced when the population size is small.
Non-spatial public debate model – For the non-spatial public debate model, our main objective
is again to determine the winning probability when starting from a fixed number of individuals
holding opinion +1. Since at each time step all the individuals are equally likely to be part of the
chosen discussion group, the actual label on each individual is unimportant. In particular, we shall
simply define Xn as the number of individuals with opinion +1 at time n rather than the vector of
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Figure 4. Probability that opinion +1 wins as a function of the initial number of its supporters in the non-spatial
public debate model. The probabilities on the left (s = 3) are computed from the first part of Theorem 2 whereas
the ones on the right (s = 4) are computed recursively from a first-step analysis.
opinions. With this new definition the winning probability can be written as
px(N, s) := probability that opinion +1 wins
:= P (Xn = N for some n > 0 | X0 = x)
(8)
where s is the group size and N is the total number of individuals. We start with the model under
the majority rule. In this case, we have the following result.
Theorem 2 (non-spatial public debate model) – Under the majority rule,
px(N, 3) = 2
−(N−3)
x−2∑
z=0
(
N − 3
z
)
for all x ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2}.
In addition, there exists a0 > 0 such that, for all ǫ > 0,
px(N, 4) ≤ exp(−a0ǫN) for all N large and x ∈ (0, (c+ − 2ǫ)N)
px(N, 4) ≥ 1− exp(−a0ǫN) for all N large and x ∈ ((c+ + 2ǫ)N,N).
Note that the first probability in the theorem can be re-written as
px(N, 3) =
card {A : A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N − 3} and card (A) ≤ x− 2}
card {A : A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N − 3}} .
Unfortunately, we do not know why the winning probability has this simple combinatorial inter-
pretation but this is what follows from our calculation which is based on a first-step analysis, a
standard technique in the theory of Markov chains. This technique can also be used to determine
the winning probabilities for larger s recursively, which is how the right-hand side of Figure 4 is ob-
tained, but for s > 3 the algebra becomes too complicated to get an explicit formula. Interestingly,
the second part of the theorem shows that the critical threshold c+ ≈ 0.768 obtained under Galam’s
assumption appears again under our assumption on the initial configuration, though it comes from
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a different calculation. This result follows partly from an application of the optimal stopping theo-
rem for supermartingales. Turning to the non-spatial public debate model under the proportional
rule, first-step analysis is again problematic when the group size exceeds three. Nevertheless, the
winning probabilities can be computed explicitly.
Theorem 3 (non-spatial public debate model) – Under the proportional rule,
px(N, s) = x/N for all s > 1.
In words, under the proportional rule, the probability that opinion +1 wins is simply equal to the
initial fraction of individuals holding this opinion. As for the second part of Theorem 2, the proof
of this result relies in part on an application of the optimal stopping theorem.
Spatial public debate model – Contrary to the non-spatial public debate model, for the spatial
version starting with a finite number of individuals with opinion +1, the number of such individuals
does not evolve according to a Markov chain because the actual location of these individuals matters.
However, under the proportional rule, the auxiliary process that keeps track of the number of
individuals with opinion +1 is a martingale with respect to the natural filtration of the spatial
model. Since it is also integer-valued and the population is infinite, it follows from the martingale
convergence theorem that opinion +1 dies out with probability one. Therefore, to avoid trivialities,
we return to Galam’s assumption for the spatial model: we assume that individuals independently
support opinion +1 with probability θ ∈ (0, 1). Since the population is infinite, both opinions
are present at any time, and the main objective is now to determine whether they can coexist at
equilibrium. The answer depends on the spatial dimension d, as for the voter model [1, 4].
Theorem 4 (spatial public debate model) – Under the proportional rule,
• the system clusters in d ≤ 2, i.e.,
lim t→∞ P (ηt(x) 6= ηt(y)) = 0 for all x, y ∈ Zd.
• both opinions coexist in d ≥ 3, i.e., ηt converges in distribution to an invariant measure in
which there is a positive density of both opinions.
The proof relies on a certain duality relationship between the spatial model and coalescing random
walks, just as for the voter model, though this relationship is somewhat hidden in the case of the
public debate model. Before proving our theorems, we point out that the spatial public debate
model under the majority rule has also been recently studied in [5]. There, it is proved that the
one-dimensional process clusters when the group size s is odd whereas opinion −1 invades the
lattice and outcompetes the other opinion when the group size is even. It is also proved based on
a rescaling argument that opinion −1 wins in two dimensions when s2 = 2× 2 = 4.
3. Proof of Theorem 1 (bottom-up hierarchical system)
The main objective is to count the number of configurations at level N with x individuals with
opinion +1 that will deterministically result in the election of type +1 president after N consecutive
voting steps. Even though the evolution rules of the voting system are deterministic (recall that
the model is only stochastic through its random initial configuration), our approach is somewhat
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reminiscent of the theory of Markov chains. The idea is to reverse time by thinking of the type
of the president at level zero as the initial state, and more generally the configuration at level n
as the state at time n. In the theory of discrete-time Markov chains, the distribution at time n
given the initial state can be computed by looking at the nth power of the transition matrix, which
keeps track of the probabilities of all possible sample paths that connect two particular states in n
time steps. To this extend, the right-hand side of (5) can be seen as the analog of the nth power
of a transition matrix, or Chapman-Kolmogorov’s equation, with however two exceptions. First,
the expression (5) is more complicated because the number of individuals per level is not constant
and therefore the evolution rules are not homogeneous in time. Second, and more importantly, the
transition probability from x→ z at time n is replaced by an integer, namely
cn(s, x, z) := the number of configurations with z individuals holding
opinion +1 at level n+ 1 that result in a given configuration
with x individuals holding opinion +1 at level n.
(9)
By thinking of the bottom-up hierarchical system going backwards in time, the question becomes:
how many configurations with x individuals of type +1 at time/level N result from the initial
configuration +1 at time/level zero, which corresponds to the victory of type +1 president. To
make the argument rigorous and prove (5), we first define
card X := card {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , sn} : X(i) = 1} for all X ∈ Λsn := {−1,+1}sn .
Recall that if Z ∈ Λsn+1 then the configuration X at level n is given by
X(i) := sign (
∑s
j=1 Z(s(i− 1) + j) − 1/2) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , sn.
which we write Z → X. We also say that configuration Z induces configuration X. More generally,
we say that configuration Z ∈ Λsm induces configuration X ∈ Λsn if
for all i ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . ,m− 1}, there exists Xi ∈ Λsi such that Xi+1 → Xi
where Xm = Z and Xn = X, which we again write Z → X. Finally, we let
cn(s,X, z) := card {Z ∈ Λsn+1 : Z → X and card Z = z} for all X ∈ Λsn
denote the number of configurations with z individuals of type +1 at level n + 1 that induce
configuration X at level n. The first key is that cn(s,X, z) only depends on the number of type +1
individuals in configuration X, which is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 – Let X,Y ∈ Λsn . Then,
card X = card Y implies that cn(s,X, z) = cn(s, Y, z).
Proof. Since card X = card Y , there exists
σ ∈ Ssn such that Y (i) = X(σ(i)) for i = 1, 2, . . . , sn
where Ssn denotes the permutation group. Using the permutation σ, we then construct an endo-
morphism on the set of configurations at level n+ 1 by setting
(φ(Z))(s(i − 1) + j) := Z(s(σ(i)− 1) + j) for i = 1, 2, . . . , sn and j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
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In words, partitioning configurations into sn consecutive blocks of size s, we set
ith block of φ(Z) := σ(i)th block of Z for all i = 1, 2, . . . , sn.
Now, we observe that
Z → X if and only if X(i) = sign (∑sj=1 Z(s(i− 1) + j)− 1/2) for all i
if and only if X(σ(i)) = sign (
∑s
j=1 Z(s(σ(i)− 1) + j)− 1/2) for all i
if and only if Y (i) = sign (
∑s
j=1(φ(Z))(s(i − 1) + j)− 1/2) for all i
if and only if φ(Z)→ Y.
Since in addition card Z = card φ(Z), which directly follows from the fact that φ(Z) is obtained
from a permutation of the blocks of size s in Z, we deduce that
φ ({Z : Z → X and card Z = z}) ⊂ {Z : Z → Y and card Z = z}.
That is, for all Z in the first set, φ(Z) is a configuration in the second set. To conclude, we observe
that the function φ is an injection from the first set to the second set. Indeed,
Z 6= Z ′ implies that Z(s(i− 1) + j) 6= Z ′(s(i− 1) + j) for some i, j
implies that Z(s(σ(i) − 1) + j) 6= Z ′(s(σ(i)− 1) + j) for some i, j
implies that (φ(Z))(s(i − 1) + j) 6= (φ(Z ′))(s(i − 1) + j) for some i, j
implies that φ(Z) 6= φ(Z ′).
The injectivity of φ implies that
cn(s,X, z) = card {Z ∈ Λsn+1 : Z → X and card Z = z}
≤ card {Z ∈ Λsn+1 : Z → Y and card Z = z} = cn(s, Y, Z).
In particular, the lemma follows from the obvious symmetry of the problem. 
In view of Lemma 5, for all x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , sn}, we can write
cn(s,X, z) := cn(s, x, z) for all X ∈ Λsn with card X = x.
The interpretation of cn(s, x, z) is given in (9). The next step to establish (5) is given by the
following lemma which follows from the deterministic nature of the evolution rules.
Lemma 6 – Let X,Y ∈ Λsn . Then,
X 6= Y implies that {Z ∈ Λsn+1 : Z → X} ∩ {Z ∈ Λsn+1 : Z → Y } = ∅.
Proof. To begin with, observe that the assumption implies that
X(i) 6= Y (i) for some i = 1, 2, . . . , sn.
In particular, if Z → X and Z ′ → Y then for this specific i we have
X(i) = sign (
∑s
j=1 Z(s(i− 1) + j)− 1/2)
6= sign (∑sj=1 Z ′(s(i− 1) + j)− 1/2) = Y (i)
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which in turn implies that
Z(s(i− 1) + j) 6= Z ′(s(i− 1) + j) for some j = 1, 2, . . . , s.
In conclusion, Z 6= Z ′. This completes the proof. 
Recalling (9) and using the fact that there is only one configuration at level zero in which type +1
is president as well as the previous lemma, we deduce that the product
c1(s, x0, x1) c2(s, x1, x2) · · · cN−1(s, xN−2, xN−1) cN (s, xN−1, xN )
is the number of configurations with xN type +1 individuals at level N that consecutively induce a
configuration with xn type +1 individuals at level n. The number of configurations with x type +1
individuals at level N that result in the election of type +1 is then obtained by setting x0 = 1 and
xN = x and by summing over all the possible values of the other xn which gives
card {X ∈ ΛsN : X → (1) and card X = x} =
s∑
x1=0
s2∑
x2=0
· · ·
sN−1∑
xN−1=0
N∏
n=1
cn(s, xn−1, xn).
As previously explained, this equation can be seen as the analog of Chapman-Kolmogorov’s equation
for time-heterogeneous Markov chains, though it represents a number of configurations rather than
transition probabilities. Finally. since there are sN choose x configurations with exactly x type +1
individuals at level N , we deduce that the conditional probability that type +1 is elected given
that there are x type +1 individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy is
px(N, s) =
(
sN
x
)−1 s∑
x1=0
s2∑
x2=0
· · ·
sN−1∑
xN−1=0
N∏
n=1
cn(s, xn−1, xn).
To complete the proof of the theorem, the last step is to compute cn(s, x, z). As a warming up, we
start by proving equation (6), the special case when s = 3.
Lemma 7 – For all y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 3n}, we have
cn(3, x, 2x + y) =
∑
i+j=y
(
x
i
)(
3n − x
j
)
3x−i+j .
Proof. Fix X ∈ Λsn with card X = x. Assume that Z → X and let zj denote the number of
blocks of size three with exactly j type +1 individuals, i.e.,
zj := card {i :
∑3
k=1 Z(3(i− 1) + k) = j − (3− j)} for all j = 0, 1, 2, 3.
The fact that card X = x imposes
z0 + z1 = 3
n − x and z2 + z3 = x. (10)
This implies that, for configuration Z,
• there are x choose z3 permutations of the blocks with 2 or 3 type +1 individuals,
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• there are 3n − x choose z1 permutations of the blocks with 0 or 1 type +1 individuals,
• there are 3 choose j possible blocks of size three with j type +1 individuals.
In particular, the number of Z → X with zj blocks with j type +1 individuals is
(
x
z3
)(
3n − x
z1
) 3∏
j=0
(
3
j
)zj
=
(
x
z3
)(
3n − x
z1
)
3z1+z2 . (11)
Using again (10) and the definition of zj also implies that
card Z = z1 + 2z2 + 3z3
= z1 + 2 (x− z3) + 3z3 = 2x+ z1 + z3 ∈ {2x, 2x + 1, . . . , 2x+ 3n}
which gives the range for y in the statement of the lemma and
y := (card Z)− 2x = z1 + z3.
This, together with (11) and z1 + z2 = z1 + x− z3, finally gives
cn(3, x, 2x + y) =
∑
z1+z3=y
(
x
z3
)(
3n − x
z1
)
3z1+z2 =
∑
z1+z3=y
(
x
z3
)(
3n − x
z1
)
3x−z3+z1 .
This completes the proof. 
Following the same approach, we now prove the general case (4).
Lemma 8 – For all (s, n) and all y ∈ Is,n as defined in (3), we have
cn(s, x, s
′x+ y) =
∑
z0,...,zs
(
sn
x
)−1( sn
z0, z1, . . . , zs
) s∏
j=0
(
s
j
)zj
where the sum is over all z0, z1, . . . , zs such that
z0 + z1 + · · · + zs′−1 = sn − x and zs′ + zs′+1 + · · ·+ zs = x
and such that ∑s′−1
j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) = y if s is odd∑s′−2
j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) + (s
′ − 1) zs′−1 = y if s is even.
Proof. Again, we fix X ∈ Λsn with card X = x, let Z → X and
zj := card {i :
∑s
k=1 Z(s(i− 1) + k) = j − (s− j)} for all j = 0, 1, . . . , s.
The fact that card X = x now imposes
z0 + z1 + · · ·+ zs′−1 = sn − x and zs′ + zs′+1 + · · ·+ zs = x. (12)
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This and the definition of zj imply that
card Z = (z1 + 2z2 + · · ·+ (s′ − 1) zs′−1) + (s′zs′ + · · ·+ szs)
= (z1 + 2z2 + · · ·+ (s′ − 1) zs′−1)
+ s′(x− zs′+1 − · · · − zs) + ((s′ + 1) zs′+1 + · · · + s zs)
= s′x+ z1 + 2 z2 + · · · + (s′ − 1) zs′−1 + zs′+1 + 2 zs′+2 + · · ·+ (s− s′) zs
card Z ∈ s′x+ {0, 1, . . . , (s′ − 1)(sn − x) + (s− s′)x}
which gives the range for y. Rearranging the terms also gives
y := (card Z)− s′x = ∑s′−1j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) if s is odd
=
∑s′−2
j=1 j (zj + zs′+j) + (s
′ − 1) zs′−1 if s is even.
(13)
Now, using again (12), we obtain:
number of permutations of the blocks
with at least s′ type +1 individuals
=
(
x
zs′ , . . . , zs
)
:=
x!
zs′ ! · · · zs!
number of permutations of the blocks
with at most s′ − 1 type +1 individuals =
(
sn − x
z0, . . . , zs′−1
)
:=
(sn − x)!
z0! · · · zs′−1!
Since there are s choose j possible blocks of size s with j type +1 individuals, the number of
configurations with zj blocks with j type +1 individuals that induce X is then(
x
zs′ , . . . , zs
)(
sn − x
z0, . . . , zs′−1
) s∏
j=0
(
s
j
)zj
=
(
sn
x
)−1( sn
z0, z1, . . . , zs
) s∏
j=0
(
s
j
)zj
.
This implies that, for all suitable y,
cn(s, x, s
′x+ y) =
∑
z0,...,zs
(
sn
x
)−1( sn
z0, z1, . . . , zs
) s∏
j=0
(
s
j
)zj
where the sum is over all z0, z1, . . . , zs such that (12) and (13) hold. 
4. Proof of Theorems 2 and 3 (non-spatial public debate model)
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorems 2 and 3 which deal with the nonspatial public
debate model. There is no more hierarchical structure and the evolution rules are now stochastic.
At each time step, s distinct individuals are chosen uniformly at random to form a discussion
group, which results in all the individuals within the group reaching a consensus. The new opinion
is chosen according to either the majority rule or the proportional rule.
Majority rule and size 3 – In this case, the process can be understood by simply using a first-
step analysis whose basic idea is to condition on all the possible outcomes of the first update and
then use the Markov property to find a relationship among the winning probabilities for the process
starting from different states. We point out that this approach is only tractable when s = 3 due to
a small number of possible outcomes at each update.
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Lemma 9 – Under the majority rule, we have
px(N, 3) = 2
−(N−3)
x−2∑
z=0
(
N − 3
z
)
for all x = 2, 3, . . . , N − 2.
Proof. The first step is to exhibit a relationship among the probabilities to be found by condi-
tioning on all the possible outcomes of the first update. Recall that
px := px(N, 3) = P (Xn = N for some n |X0 = x)
and, for x = 2, 3, . . . , N − 2, let µx := q−1(x)/q1(x) where
qj(x) := P (Xn+1 = x+ j |Xn = x) for j = −1, 1. (14)
Conditioning on the possible values for X1 and using the Markov property, we obtain
px = P (Xn = N for some n |X1 = x− 1) P (X1 = x− 1 |X0 = x)
+ P (Xn = N for some n |X1 = x) P (X1 = x |X0 = x)
+ P (Xn = N for some n |X1 = x+ 1) P (X1 = x+ 1 |X0 = x)
= q−1(x) px−1 + (1− q−1(x) + q1(x)) px + q1(x) px+1.
In particular, q1(x) (px+1 − px) = q−1(x) (px − px−1) so a simple induction gives
px+1 − px = µx (px − px−1) = µx µx−1 (px−1 − px−2)
= · · · = µx µx−1 · · · µ2 (p2 − p1) = µx µx−1 · · · µ2 p2.
Using again that p1 = 0, it follows that
px =
x−1∑
z=1
(pz+1 − pz) =
(
1 +
x−1∑
z=2
µ2 µ3 · · · µz
)
p2. (15)
Now, using that pN−1 = 1, we obtain
pN−1 =
(
1 +
N−2∑
z=2
µ2 µ3 · · · µz
)
p2 = 1. (16)
Combining (15) and (16), we deduce that
px =
(
1 +
x−1∑
z=2
µ2 µ3 · · · µz
)
p2
=
(
1 +
x−1∑
z=2
µ2 µ3 · · · µz
)(
1 +
N−2∑
z=2
µ2 µ3 · · · µz
)−1
.
(17)
To find an explicit expression for (17), the last step is to compute q−1(x) and q1(x). Observing
that these two probabilities are respectively the probability of selecting a group with one type +1
individual and the probability of selecting a group with two type +1 individuals, we get
q−1(x) =
(
N
3
)−1(x
1
)(
N − x
2
)
and q1(x) =
(
N
3
)−1(x
2
)(
N − x
1
)
.
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This gives the following expression for the ratio:
µx :=
q−1(x)
q1(x)
=
x (N − x)(N − x− 1)
x (x− 1)(N − x) =
N − x− 1
x− 1
for x = 2, 3, . . . , N − 2, and the following expression for the product:
µ2 µ3 · · · µz = N − 3
1
N − 4
2
· · · N − z − 1
z − 1
=
(N − 3)!
(z − 1)! (N − z − 2)! =
(
N − 3
z − 1
) (18)
for z = 2, 3, . . . , N − 2. Finally, combining (17) and (18), we obtain
px =
(
1 +
x−1∑
z=2
(
N − 3
z − 1
))(
1 +
N−2∑
z=2
(
N − 3
z − 1
))−1
=
(N−3∑
z=0
(
N − 3
z
))−1 x−2∑
z=0
(
N − 3
z
)
= 2−(N−3)
x−2∑
z=0
(
N − 3
z
)
for all x ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2}. This completes the proof. 
Majority rule and size 4 – Increasing the common size of the discussion groups, a first-step
analysis can again be used to find a recursive formula for the winning probabilities but the algebra
becomes too messy to deduce an explicit formula. Instead, we prove lower and upper bounds for the
winning probabilities using the optimal stopping theorem for supermartingales. To describe more
precisely our approach, consider the transition probabilities
qj(x) := P (Xn+1 −Xn = j |Xn = x) for j = −2,−1, 0, 1
as well as the new Markov chain (Zn) with transition probabilities
p(0, 0) = p(N,N) = 1 and p(x, x+ j) = qj(x) (q1(x) + q−1(x) + q−2(x))
−1
for all x = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and all j = −2,−1, 1. The process (Zn) can be seen as the random
sequence of states visited by the public debate model until fixation. In particular,
px(N, 4) := P (Xn = N for some n > 0) = P (Zn = N for some n > 0).
The main idea of the proof is to first identify exponentials of the process (Zn) that are supermartin-
gales and then apply the optimal stopping theorem to these processes. We start by proving that
the drift of the Markov chain is either negative or positive depending on whether the number of
individuals in favor of the +1 opinion is smaller or larger than c+ ≈ 0.768. In particular, we recover
the critical threshold c+ found by Galam using a different calculation.
Lemma 10 – For all ǫ > 0,
E (Zn+1 − Zn |Zn = x) ≤ − (1/2)(
√
13− 1) ǫ+O(N−1) for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N)
≥ + √13 ǫ+O(N−1) for all x ∈ ((c+ + ǫ)N,N).
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Proof. Observing that q−2(x) is the probability that a randomly chosen group of size 4 has two
individuals in favor and two individuals against the +1 opinion, we obtain that
q−2(x) =
(
N
4
)−1 x (x− 1)
2
(N − x)(N − x− 1)
2
= 6 c2 (1− c)2 +O(N−1)
provided x = ⌊cN⌋. Similarly, we show that
q1(x) = 4 c
3 (1− c) +O(N−1) and q−1(x) = 4 c (1 − c)3 +O(N−1)
from which it follows that
q1(x)− q−1(x)− 2 q−2(x) = 4 c3 (1− c)− 4 c (1 − c)3 − 12 c2 (1− c)2 +O(N−1)
= 4 c (1 − c)(c3 − c− 1) +O(N−1)
q1(x) + q−1(x) + q−2(x) = 4 c
3 (1− c) + 4 c (1 − c)3 + 6 c2 (1− c)2 +O(N−1)
= 2 c (1 − c)(c2 − c+ 2) +O(N−1).
Taking the ratio of the previous two estimates leads to
E (Zn+1 − Zn |Zn = x) = 6 (c− c−)(c− c+)(c2 − c+ 2)−1 +O(N−1)
from which we deduce that
E (Zn+1 − Zn |Zn = x) ≤ 3 (−c−)(−ǫ) +O(N−1) = −(1/2)(
√
13− 1) ǫ+O(N−1)
for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N) and
E (Zn+1 − Zn |Zn = x) ≥ 3 (c+ − c−) ǫ+O(N−1) =
√
13 ǫ+O(N−1)
for all x ∈ ((c+ + ǫ)N,N). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 11 – There exists a0 > 0 such that
E (exp(a0Zn+1)− exp(a0Zn) |Zn = x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N)
E (exp(−a0Zn+1)− exp(−a0Zn) |Zn = x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ((c+ + ǫ)N,N)
for all N sufficiently large.
Proof. To begin with, we define the functions
φx(a) := E (exp(aZn+1)− exp(aZn) |Zn = x).
Differentiating then applying Lemma 10, we obtain
φ′x(a) = E (Zn+1 exp(aZn+1)− Zn exp(aZn) |Zn = x)
φ′x(0) = E (Zn+1 − Zn |Zn = x) ≤ −(1/2)(
√
13− 1) ǫ+O(N−1) < 0
for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N) and N large. Since φx(0) = 0, there is a+ > 0 such that
φx(a) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ (0, a+) and all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N).
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Differentiating a 7→ φx(−a) and using Lemma 10, we also have
φx(−a) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ (0, a−) and all x ∈ ((c+ + ǫ)N,N)
for some a− > 0. In particular, for a0 := min(a+, a−) > 0,
φx(a0) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − ǫ)N)
φx(−a0) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ((c+ + ǫ)N,N)
which, recalling the definition of φx, is exactly the statement of the lemma. 
With Lemma 11 in hands, we are now ready to prove the upper and lower bounds for the winning
probabilities using the optimal stopping theorem.
Lemma 12 – For all ǫ > 0,
px(N, 4) ≤ exp(−a0ǫN) for all N large and x ∈ (0, (c+ − 2ǫ)N).
Proof. First, we introduce the stopping times
τ0 := inf {n : Zn = 0} and τ− := inf {n : Zn > (c+ − ǫ)N}
as well as T− := min(τ0, τ−). Since the process exp(a0Zn) stopped at time T− is a supermartingale
according to the first assertion in Lemma 11 and the stopping time T− is almost surely finite, the
optimal stopping theorem implies that
E (exp(a0ZT−) |Z0 = x) ≤ E (exp(a0Z0) |Z0 = x) ≤ exp(a0(c+ − 2ǫ)N) (19)
for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − 2ǫ)N). In addition,
E (exp(a0ZT−)) = E (exp(a0ZT−) |T− = τ0)P (T− = τ0)
+ E (exp(a0ZT−) |T− = τ−)P (T− = τ−)
≥ P (T− = τ0) + exp(a(c+ − ǫ)N)P (T− 6= τ0)
= 1 − (1− exp(a0(c+ − ǫ)N))P (T− 6= τ0).
(20)
Noticing that opinion +1 wins only if T− 6= τ0 and combining (19)–(20), we get
px(N, 4) ≤ P (T− 6= τ0) ≤ (exp(a0(c+ − 2ǫ)N)− 1)(exp(a0(c+ − ǫ)N)− 1)−1
≤ exp(a0(c+ − 2ǫ)N) (exp(a0(c+ − ǫ)N))−1 = exp(−a0ǫN).
for all x ∈ (0, (c+ − 2ǫ)N) and all N sufficiently large. 
Lemma 13 – For all ǫ > 0,
px(N, 4) ≥ 1− exp(−a0ǫN) for all N large and x ∈ ((c+ + 2ǫ)N,N).
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Proof. This is similar to the proof of Lemma 12. Let T+ := min(τN , τ+) where
τN := inf {n : Zn = N} and τ+ := inf {n : Zn < (c+ + ǫ)N}
and apply Lemma 11 and the optimal stopping theorem to obtain
E (exp(−a0ZT+) |Z0 = x) ≤ E (exp(−a0Z0) |Z0 = x) ≤ exp(−a0(c+ + 2ǫ)N) (21)
for all x ∈ ((c+ + 2ǫ)N,N). Moreover,
E (exp(−a0ZT+)) = E (exp(−a0ZT+) |T+ = τN )P (T+ = τN )
+ E (exp(−a0ZT+) |T+ = τ+)P (T+ = τ+)
≥ exp(−a0N)P (T+ = τN ) + exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N)P (T+ 6= τN )
= exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N) + (exp(−a0N)− exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N))P (T+ = τN ).
(22)
Combining (21)–(22) and using that opinion +1 wins if T+ = τN , we get
px(N, 4) ≥ P (T+ = τN )
≥ (exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N)− exp(−a0(c+ + 2ǫ)N))
(exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N)− exp(−a0N))−1
≥ (exp(−a0(c+ + ǫ)N)− exp(−a0(c+ + 2ǫ)N)) exp(a0(c+ + ǫ)N)
= 1− exp(−a0ǫN)
for all x ∈ ((c+ + 2ǫ)N,N) and all N sufficiently large. 
Proportional rule – We now prove Theorem 3, which deals with the non-spatial public debate
model under the proportional rule. To begin with, we introduce the transition probabilities
rj(x) := P (Xn+1 −Xn = j |Xn = x) for all j ≥ 0
lj(x) := P (Xn+1 −Xn = −j |Xn = x) for all j ≥ 0
where r and l stand for right and left, respectively. As previously, a first-step analysis does not
allow to find an explicit expression for the winning probabilities, but the result can be deduced
from the optimal stopping theorem observing that the number of individuals in favor of a given
opinion is a martingale with respect to the natural filtration of the process.
Lemma 14 – Under the proportional rule, we have px(N, s) = x/N .
Proof. Since an update can only result in an increase of the number of +1 individuals by j if the
discussion group selected has exactly s− j individuals in favor of +1, we have
rj(x) =
(
N
s
)−1( x
s− j
)(
N − x
j
)(
s− j
s
)
(23)
for all j ∈ Ix := {max(0, s − x), . . . ,min(s,N − x)}. Similarly,
lj(x) =
(
N
s
)−1(x
j
)(
N − x
s− j
)(
s− j
s
)
(24)
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for all j ∈ Jx := {max(0, s − (N − x)), . . . ,min(s, x)}. Now, let
m(x) := max(0, s − x) and M(x) := min(s, x)
and observe that
s−m(x) = s−max(0, s − x) = s+min(0, x− s) = min(s, x) = M(x)
s−M(N − x) = s−min(s,N − x) = s+max(−s,−(N − x))
= max(0, s − (N − x)) = m(N − x).
This shows that Jx = s−Ix for all x. In particular, using the transformation j 7→ s−j and recalling
the expression of the two conditional probabilities (23)–(24), we obtain
∑
j∈Ix
j rj(x) =
∑
j∈Ix
j
(
N
s
)−1( x
s− j
)(
N − x
j
)(
s− j
s
)
=
∑
j∈Jx
(s− j)
(
N
s
)−1(x
j
)(
N − x
s− j
)(
j
s
)
=
∑
j∈Jx
j
(
N
s
)−1(x
j
)(
N − x
s− j
)(
s− j
s
)
=
∑
j∈Jx
j lj(x)
which gives the conditional expectation
E (Xn+1 −Xn |Xn = x) =
∑
j∈Ix
j rj(x) −
∑
j∈Jx
j lj(x) = 0.
This shows that the process (Xn) is a martingale. Now, let
T+ := inf {n : Xn = N} and T− := inf {n : Xn = 0}
and observe that the stopping time T := min(T+, T−) is almost surely finite. Since in addition the
process is bounded, an application of the optimal stopping theorem implies that
E (XT |X0 = x) = E (X0 |X0 = x) = x
= N × P (T = T+) + 0× P (T = T−) = N px(N, s)
from which it follows that px(N, s) = x/N . 
5. Proof of Theorem 4 (spatial public debate model)
To conclude, we study the spatial version of the public debate model introduced in [5] but replacing
the majority rule with the proportional rule. The key to our analysis is similar to the approach
used in previous works [1, 4] about the voter model. The idea is to construct the process from a
so-called Harris’ graphical representation and then use the resulting graphical structure to exhibit
a relationship between the process and a system of coalescing random walks.
Graphical representations – We first give a possible graphical representation from which the
spatial public debate model can be constructed starting from any initial configuration. Though
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natural, this graphical representation does not allow to derive a useful duality relationship between
the process and coalescing random walks. We then introduce an alternative way to construct the
process leading to such a duality relationship. Recall that
{x+Bs : x ∈ Zd} where Bs := {0, 1, . . . , s− 1}d
represents the collection of discussion groups. Each of these groups is updated in continuous time at
rate one, i.e., at the arrival times of independent Poisson processes with intensity one. In addition,
since the new opinion of the group after an update is chosen to be +1 with probability the fraction
of +1 individuals in the group just before the update, the new opinion can be determined by
comparing the fraction of +1 with a uniform random variable over the unit interval. In particular,
a natural way to construct the spatial public debate model graphically is to
• let Tn(x) := the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with rate one and
• let Un(x) := a uniform random variable over the interval (0, 1)
for all x ∈ Zd and n > 0. At time t := Tn(x), all the individuals in x + Bs are simultaneously
updated as a result of a discussion and we set
ηt(y) := 2× 1{Un(x) < s−d
∑
z∈x+Bs
1{ηt−(z) = +1}} − 1 for all y ∈ x+Bs (25)
while the configuration outside x + Bs stays unchanged. An idea of Harris [3] implies that the
process starting from any initial configuration can be constructed using this rule. We now construct
another process (ξt) with the same state space as follows: the times at which individuals in the
same discussion group interact are defined as above from the same collection of independent Poisson
processes, but to determine the outcome of the discussion we now
• let Wn(x) := a uniform random variable over the set x+Bs
for all x ∈ Zd and n > 0. At time t := Tn(x), all the individuals in x + Bs are simultaneously
updated as a result of a discussion and we set
ξt(y) := ξt−(Wn(x)) for all y ∈ x+Bs (26)
while the configuration outside x + Bs stays unchanged. The next lemma, whose proof is simply
based on a re-writing of events under consideration, shows that both rules (25)–(26) define in fact
the same process: the processes (ηt) and (ξt) are stochastically equal.
Lemma 15 – Both constructions (25)–(26) are equivalent:
ηt− = ξt− implies P (ηt(x) = 1) = P (ξt(x) = 1) for all x ∈ Zd.
Proof. This is only nontrivial for pairs (x, t) ∈ Zd × R+ such that
t := Tn(z) and x ∈ z +Bs for some (z, n) ∈ Zd × N∗.
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(x, t) (x, t) (y, t)
Figure 5. Picture of the graphical representation and set of ancestors. In both pictures, s = 4 and the times are which
discussion groups are updated (time goes up) are represented by horizontal line segments while the set of ancestors
is represented by vertical line segments. The left-hand and right-hand pictures give respectively an illustration of the
set-valued process (27) and an illustration of the dual process (28) starting from A = {x, y}. The open circles on the
right-hand side correspond to the value of the uniform W random variables.
In this case, we have
P (ξt(x) = 1) = P (ξt−(Wn(z)) = 1)
= P (Wn(z) ∈ {y ∈ z +Bs : ξt−(y) = 1})
= card {y ∈ z +Bs : ξt−(y) = 1}/ card (z +Bs)
= s−d
∑
y∈z+Bs
1{ξt−(y) = 1}
= P (Un(z) < s
−d
∑
y∈z+Bs
1{ξt−(y) = 1})
= P (Un(z) < s
−d
∑
y∈z+Bs
1{ηt−(y) = 1}) = P (ηt(x) = 1).
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Duality with coalescing random walks – The duality relationship between the voter model and
coalescing random walks results from keeping track of the ancestors of different space-time points
going backwards in time through the graphical representation. In the case of the public debate
model η·, the opinion of an individual just after an interaction depends on the opinion of all the
individuals in the corresponding discussion group just before the interaction. Therefore, to define
the set of ancestors of a given space-time point, we draw an arrow
z1 → z2 at time t := Tn(z) for all z1, z2 ∈ z +Bs and (z, n) ∈ Zd × N∗
to indicate that the opinion at (z2, t) depends on the opinion at (z1, t−), and say that there is a
η-path connecting two space-time points, which we write
(y, t− s)→η (x, t) for x, y ∈ Zd and s, t > 0,
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whenever there are sequences of times and spatial locations
t− s < s1 < s2 < · · · < sn−1 < t and z1 := y, z2, . . . , zn := x ∈ Zd
such that there is an arrow
zj → zj+1 at time sj for j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
The set of ancestors of (x, t) at time t− s is then encoded in the set-valued process
ηˆs(x, t) := {y ∈ Zd : (y, t− s)→η (x, t)}. (27)
Note that the opinion at (x, t) can be deduced from the graphical representation of η· and the
initial opinion at sites that belong to ηˆt(x, t). Note also that the process (27) grows linearly going
backwards in time, i.e., increasing s. See the left-hand side of Figure 5 for a picture. This makes
the process η· mathematically intractable to prove clustering and coexistence. To establish the
connection between the spatial process and coalescing random walks, we use instead the other,
mathematically equivalent, version ξ· of the spatial public debate model. For this version, the
opinion of an individual just after an interaction depends on the opinion of only one individual in
the corresponding discussion group just before the interaction. The location of this individual is
given by the value of the uniform W random variables. Therefore, to define the set of ancestors of
a given space-time point, we now draw an arrow
Wn(z) → z′ at time t := Tn(z) for all z′ ∈ z +Bs and (z, n) ∈ Zd × N∗
to indicate that the opinion at (z′, t) depends on the opinion at (Wn(z), t−). We then define ξ-
paths, which we now write →ξ, as previously but using this new random set of arrows. The set of
ancestors of (x, t) at time t− s is now encoded in
ξˆs(x, t) := {y ∈ Zd : (y, t− s)→ξ (x, t)}. (28)
More generally, for A ⊂ Zd finite, we define the dual process starting at (A, t) as
ξˆs(A, t) := {y ∈ Zd : y ∈ ξˆs(x, t) for some x ∈ A}
:= {y ∈ Zd : (y, t− s)→ξ (x, t) for some x ∈ A}.
See the right-hand side of Figure 5 for a picture. Note that (28) is reduced to a singleton for all
times s ∈ (0, t) and that we have the duality relationship
ξt(x) = ξt−s(Zs(x)) = ξ0(Zt(x)) for all s ∈ (0, t) (29)
where Zs(x) := ξˆs(x, t). In the next lemma, we prove that Zs(x) is a symmetric random walk,
which makes the dual process itself a system of coalescing symmetric random walks with one walk
starting from each site in the finite set A.
Lemma 16 – The process Zs(x) := ξˆs(x, t) is a symmetric random walk.
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Proof. By construction of the dual process, for t− s := Tn(z),
Zs(x) := ξˆs(x, t) = Zs−(x) when Zs−(x) /∈ z +Bs
= Wn(z) when Zs−(x) ∈ z +Bs.
Since in addition discussion groups are updated at rate one and
P (Wn(z) = y) = s
−d for all y ∈ z +Bs
we obtain the following transition rates:
lim h→0 h
−1 P (Zs+h(x) = y +w | Zs(x) = y)
= s−d card {z ∈ Zd : y ∈ z +Bs and y + w ∈ z +Bs}.
(30)
In addition, since for all w ∈ Zd the translation operator y 7→ y+w is a one-to-one correspondence
from the set of discussion groups to itself and since
y, y + w ∈ z +Bs if and only if y −w, y ∈ (z − w) +Bs
we have the equality
card {z ∈ Zd : y ∈ z +Bs and y + w ∈ z +Bs}
= card {z ∈ Zd : y ∈ z +Bs and y − w ∈ z +Bs}.
(31)
Combining (30)–(31), we conclude that
lim h→0 h
−1 P (Zs+h(x) = y + w | Zs(x) = y)
= lim h→0 h
−1 P (Zs+h(x) = y − w | Zs(x) = y)
for all y,w ∈ Zd, which completes the proof. 
In fact, some basic geometry shows that
lim h→0 h
−1 P (Zs+h(x) = y + w | Zs(x) = y) = s−d
d∏
j=1
(s− |wj |)
where wj is the jth coordinate of the vector w. With Lemma 15, which shows that ξ· is indeed the
spatial public debate model, and the previous lemma in hands, the rest of the proof of the theorem
follows the lines of the corresponding result for the voter model [1, 4]. Since it is short, we briefly
recall the main ideas in the next two lemmas that deal with the clustering part and the coexistence
part of the theorem, respectively.
Lemma 17 – Assume that d ≤ 2. Then,
lim t→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) = 0 for all x, y ∈ Zd.
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Proof. Since Zs(x) and Zs(y) evolve according to independent random walks run at rate one
until they coalesce, the difference between the random walks Zs(x) − Zs(y) is a continuous-time
symmetric random walk run at rate two absorbed at site zero. Since this random walk has in
addition a finite range of interactions, it is recurrent in one and two dimensions, hence
lim t→∞ P (Zt(x) 6= Zt(y)) = lim t→∞ P (Zs(x)− Zs(y) 6= 0 for all s < t) = 0.
By the duality relationship (29), we conclude that
lim t→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) ≤ lim t→∞ P (Zt(x) 6= Zt(y)) = 0.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 18 – Assume that d ≥ 3. Then, ξt converges in distribution to an invariant measure in
which there is a positive density of both opinions.
Proof. To prove convergence to a stationary distribution, we first observe that there is no +1
individual in the set A at time t if and only if there is no +1 individual in the corresponding dual
process at time 0. In particular, identifying ξt with the set of +1 individuals, we get
P (ξt ∩A = ∅) = E
(
(1− θ)|ξˆt(A,t)|
)
. (32)
The dominated convergence theorem implies that both terms in (32) have a limit as time goes to
infinity, which proves the existence of a stationary distribution. Moreover, using again the duality
relationship (29) and the fact that symmetric simple random walks are transient in three or higher
dimensions, we obtain the positivity of the limit
lim t→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) = lim t→∞ P (ξ0(Zt(x)) 6= ξ0(Zt(y)))
= lim t→∞ 2θ(1− θ) P (Zt(x) 6= Zt(y)) > 0.
This shows that the spatial public debate model converges to a stationary distribution in which the
density of +1 individuals and the density of −1 individuals are both positive. 
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